Subordinate Legislation, UGC Act, Article 254: The Strain on Federal Balance in University Governance

The authors, Tanmay Durani and Shreya Jain, are 4th year students at Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab.

Featured Artwork: The Indian Express

Federalism in India, as outlined in the Constitution of India, divides powers between the Union and State governments, ensuring that states manage their own affairs while promoting cooperative federalism for national issues. This balance supports state autonomy, especially in areas like education, where State legislatures regulate university systems. However, the recent University Grants Commission (“UGC”) regulation on Vice-Chancellor (“VC”) appointments under the UGC Act raises concerns. The regulation conflicts with state laws governing VC appointments, centralizing control and potentially undermining state autonomy in educational governance. This centralization threatens the balance of federalism and academic independence in universities.

This piece substantiates arguments in three parts: First, we argue that the UGC regulation on Vice-Chancellor appointments oversteps the UGC Act, 1956,  particularly by interpreting “teaching-staff” to include the Vice-Chancellor, an administrative role. Second, we contend that the UGC Regulation as subordinate legislation, lacks necessary Parliamentary-scrutiny, questioning its authority to override state laws. Finally, we highlight the erosion of state autonomy in university governance, where centralizing power and reducing state influence in VC appointments could compromise academic standards and disrupt cooperative federalism in higher education.

UGC Regulations are Ultra-Vires

At the very outset, it is essential to examine the UGC regulation in question from a first-principles perspective. One of the key arguments against the regulation hinges on the assertion that the position of Vice-Chancellor does not fall within the ambit of “teaching-staff” as defined under Section 26(1)(e) of the UGC Act. As of now, this assertion is legally incorrect because, in the case of Kalyani Mathivanan vs K V Keyaraj the Supreme Court [SC] held that the Vice-Chancellor shall be deemed a ‘teaching-staff’ of the university.

Our disagreement with this decision stems from the principles of interpretation used by the Court to arrive at this conclusion. Section 26(1)(e) of the UGC Act empowers the UGC to prescribe qualifications for any person to be appointed to the “teaching-staff.” In Kalyani, the Court ruled that the Vice-Chancellor must be considered part of the “teaching-staff” within the scope of UGC’s authority. This ruling effectively overturned Suresh Patilkhede, which had held otherwise.

The primary issue lies in the interpretative approach adopted by the Court, which did not follow a literal construction method. A foundational principle of statutory interpretation in Indian law is that, at the outset, legislative-intent should be discerned through a plain reading of the statute. According to this principle, words should be given their “ordinary-meaning” unless they are specifically defined within the statute. Only if the words are ambiguous—capable of having more than one reasonable interpretation—should the judiciary consider ancillary factors, such as context, purpose, and object of the legislation.

We submit that the plain meaning of the term “teaching-staff” is well-established in English-language usage – uniformly referring to faculty or staff who are directly responsible for teaching [Ref: OECD, Collins Dictionary, UNESCWA]. Teaching-staff are classified based on their instructional responsibilities, such as preparing course material, delivering lectures, and assessing students. However, in Kalyani, the Court made an expansive interpretation, suggesting that the Vice-Chancellor should be classified as part of the “teaching-staff” due to their role as the academic head of the university, overseeing education, research, and faculty development. This interpretation stretches the ordinary meaning of the term beyond its conventional understanding, applying it to the Vice-Chancellor despite their predominantly administrative responsibilities. The Vice-Chancellor does not engage in direct classroom teaching or the delivery of education to students. By recognizing a Vice-Chancellor, whose primary role is administrative rather than instructional, as part of the teaching-staff, the Court sets a precedent that risks blurring the clear distinction between governance and instruction.

Subordinate legislation – Would repugnancy arise?

Subordinate legislation refers to laws made by a person or body other than Parliament, under powers granted by statute or legislation itself made under statutory authority [Halsbury’s Laws of England (Third-Edition, Volume-36)]. When subordinate legislation is enacted, it does so under the authority and control of Parliament itself, which remains the ultimate controller of the legislation.

Subordinate legislation can be laid before Parliament (or, the legislature) in three ways [Craies , Statute-Law (Sixth-Edition, p-304)]:

1. Laying without further procedure – The subordinate legislation takes effect immediately and is presented only for informational purposes.
2. Negative resolution procedure – The legislation takes effect immediately but may be annulled or modified by the legislature within a specific period.
3. Affirmative resolution procedure – The legislation takes effect only after receiving prior approval from the legislature, ensuring direct Parliamentary scrutiny and control.

The purpose of this is for the Parliament to maintain supervision and control over legislative actions of the Union.

Assuming that UGC was well within its powers to promulgate a regulation in the context of Vice-Chancellor appointments, we submit that it cannot invalidate a state legislation that is already occupying the same field—namely, Vice-Chancellor appointments.

Article 254 of the Indian Constitution addresses the issue of repugnancy between central and state laws. Under this article, if a state-law contradicts a Parliamentary Law on a matter in the Concurrent List, the Parliamentary Law prevails, provided it has received the assent of the President. However, a state law can prevail over a Parliamentary Law if it also receives Presidential assent.

The key question that arises is whether subordinate legislation enacted under a Parliamentary Act hold the same force of law as the Act itself under Article 254. In State Of West Bengal vs Anindya Sundar Das, the Court answered affrimatively, reasoning that since Section 28 of the UGC Act requires Rules and Regulations to be laid before both Houses of Parliament, they acquire statutory force and become an extension of the parent Act. As a result, these rules—being inseparable from the Act—can, under Article 254, override a conflicting State law in the same field.

However, we submit that this interpretation is flawed. Article 254, titled “Inconsistency between laws made by Parliament and laws made by the Legislatures of States”, applies only to laws made by Parliament, not subordinate legislation created by the executive under Parliamentary delegation. There is a crucial distinction between:

1. Laws made directly by Parliament, which hold full legislative authority; and
2. Laws made by a delegate of Parliament (the executive), which may have the force of law but are not equivalent to Parliamentary law.

For subordinate legislation to be considered on par with Parliamentary law under Article 254, it must undergo rigorous Parliamentary scrutiny—ensuring that it becomes law only after being examined with the same level of oversight as any other legislation. As the title of Article 254 suggests, only the affirmative resolution procedure meets this standard.

A key issue arises in Section 28 of the UGC Act, which mandates Parliamentary oversight but only through the negative resolution procedure. This allows UGC regulations—such as those governing Vice Chancellor appointments—to take effect before Parliament has had the chance to review or annul them. As a result, if a State appoints Vice Chancellors under its own law, those appointments could later be invalidated simply because UGC regulations came into force before Parliamentary review was complete. This weakens Parliamentary control and enables executive-made regulations to override State laws without sufficient legislative scrutiny.

To uphold the intent of Article 254, courts should recognize only those rules and regulations passed through the affirmative resolution procedure as part of the parent Act. Otherwise, treating executive-made regulations as equivalent to Parliamentary law would not only contradict Article 254’s intent, but also disrupt the balance of power between Parliament, the Executive, and State legislatures.

Ramifications

Erosion of State Autonomy in Legislative and Executive Powers

The consequence of such interpretation is that the will of a state legislature, representatives elected by the electorate, becomes subordinate to subordinate legislation enacted by the Union Government. The latter may include ministers who are indirectly elected to the Rajya Sabha and may not possess the same level of democratic legitimacy.

It is also worth considering the decision of Calcutta HC in Medical Council of India v. State of WB, which, though arguably per incuriam, is submitted to be correct. In this case, the High Court addressed the issue of repugnancy between the Bengal Medical Act, 1914, and the rules and regulations under the Medical Council Act, 1956, holding that “subordinate legislation cannot contradict the supreme legislation” of a State, as the State law is superior in the hierarchy of laws. The Bombay HC followed this decision in Suresh Patilkhede but was subsequently overruled by the SC in Kalyani.

Interestingly, none of these cases considered the ratio in the SC case of Ch. Tika Ramji vs. State of UP, which arose from the conflict between the Central Government’s Sugarcane-Control Order, 1955, issued under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, and the existing provisions of the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953 – where the three-judge bench ruled that the power to repeal state-laws rested solely with Parliament, which could not delegate this authority to the executive.

There is a potential fallout of its interpretation of Article 254(2) as well. As an exception to the doctrine of repugnancy, Article 254(2) allows a State law to prevail over a Central law if it has received the assent of the President of India. By extending Article 254(1) to include delegated legislation, the SC has subjected State legislatures to the cumbersome process of obtaining Presidential assent whenever Union-made rules conflict with State laws. This undermines State autonomy, as the President acts on the aid and advice of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, effectively placing the central executive above State legislatures in matters of delegated legislation. This stands in contrast to the more rigorous legislative procedures required for the passage of State or Parliamentary laws, which involve greater scrutiny and formal approval. While the SC did not address this issue directly, the indirect consequences of its interpretation will inevitably affect the operation of Article 254(2).

Centralization on University Governance and Federalism

The Draft-Regulations raise concerns about the growing influence of political and ideological factors in university leadership. Per the Kothari Commission, VCs are expected to be distinguished academics. However, the new regulations widen the candidate pool to include individuals with non-academic backgrounds in industry, public administration, or policy. By increasing VCs’ control over faculty selection, this centralization could compromise academic standards, allowing political or ideological biases to prioritize loyalty over merit, undermining academic freedom and leading to a more politicized education system.

Further, these regulations propose a centralized approach to appointing VCs, diminishing State governments’ role in state university governance. The regulations enforce a uniform Search-cum-Selection Committee, with nominees from the Chancellor (often the Governor), UGC, and the university, leaving limited space for state input. This centralization undermines the autonomy of state legislatures, which have historically managed such appointments. As State-Governors are increasingly influenced by the Centre, these regulations could further erode cooperative federalism in higher education.

Conclusion

Cooperative federalism is vital to India’s constitutional framework, ensuring both Union and State governments function as co-equal entities. The division of legislative powers under the Seventh Schedule reinforces this balance, with university governance primarily under State jurisdiction, except where national standards require coordination. Entry 66 of the Union List was never intended to centralize control over higher education, as clarified by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar during the Constituent Assembly Debates. However, the UGC’s draft regulations encroach upon State authority, undermining the legislative and executive autonomy of State governments. The threat of punitive measures, such as withholding UGC funding, further disrupts this balance, compelling compliance rather than fostering collaboration. Instead of unilateral policymaking, a cooperative federal approach is essential to maintain academic standards while respecting State autonomy. To safeguard India’s diverse higher education landscape, governance must remain decentralized, with both Union and State governments working as partners rather than adversaries.