The Authors, Arpit Pandey and Saumil Ahuja, are 3rd-year students at Christ (Deemed to be University), Bangalore.
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On May 20, 2025, a 3-judge bench of the Supreme Court of India delivered a judgement that has profound implications for the future of India’s judicial system. In the judgement titled All India Judges Association v. Union of India, the court reinstated the mandatory three-year practice requirement for entry into the district judiciary as Civil Judge (Junior Division), reversing decades of progressive policy aimed at democratising judicial access. The decision followed recommendations from most States and High Courts; however, a few of them have opposed the same. This ruling highlights the consistently inconsistent approach of the Supreme Court on judicial recruitment that amounts to a policy reversal, disproportionately affecting marginalised groups, especially women.
Challenging the judgement, a review petition has been filed by Senior Advocate Colin Gonsalves, urging the Court to review the decision on the ground that a significant number of law graduates, who planned their careers based on the previous eligibility norms, will now suffer a setback in their continuity of preparation. A similar review petition was filed by Advocate Chandra Sen Yadav, who contended that the rule violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and sought the deferment of this rule till 2027.
The Supreme Court’s Inconsistent Approach
The Supreme Court’s ruling on the three-year practice requirement has been marked by what can only be described as judicial inconsistency. The evolution of this rule began with the 1991 All India Judges Association case, which recommended uniformity in service conditions and supported allowing fresh law graduates to enter the judicial services. The court considered the recommendation of the 117th Law Commission Report that the fresh law graduates should be allowed to enter into the judicial service, and an intensive training would outweigh the advantage, if any, of three years’ practice at the Bar. However, this progressive move was reversed in 1993 when the Court mandated the three-year practice requirement, characterising the move as necessary for judicial competence.
The pendulum swung again in 2002 when the Court, following the recommendations of Justice Shetty Commission, scrapped the three-year practice requirement, on the basis that it failed to “attract the best talent of the country”. The Court had deemed the rule counterproductive to merit-based recruitment, yet it has now reversed its stance, reinstating its own previously rejected eligibility. This pattern of reversals reveals a deeper institutional problem.
The Flawed Premise: “Fresh Law Graduates” as “Raw Graduates”
The judgement reflects treating “fresh law graduates” as “raw graduates”, reflecting a limited view of modern legal education that may unknowingly reinforce traditional assumptions about professional competence. The judgement favours what can only be described as the “elite class”, including those who can afford to spend three additional years without a stable income, supported by family wealth. This eligibility poses a significant gap for economically deprived candidates who, despite strong academic performance, will find it difficult to sustain themselves during periods of unpaid or minimally paid practice.
A shocking data reveals that a 10th pass clerical and supervisory staff in Delhi is mandated a minimum pay of ₹21,917 and an unskilled worker is given a minimum pay scale of ₹18,066. Whereas, the Bar Council of India (BCI) recommends a ₹15,000 to ₹20,000 stipend for law graduates when working under a senior advocate. This underlines the bias of expecting highly qualified graduates to accept lower pay while being barred from immediate entry into judicial roles.
Moreover, the judgement lacks empirical evidence. Despite the raised concerns about “behavioural and temperamental problems” among fresh graduates, no data has been presented to substantiate these claims. The absence of evidence makes the policy arbitrary. Instead, it has been observed that the High Court judges have been rendering controversial rulings. Recently, a striking instance was seen where the Supreme Court criticised and held that settlement in cases of rape is not a viable solution, in a judgement given by the Madhya Pradesh High Court for diluting a conviction for rape into assault or criminal force to a woman with the intent to outrage her modesty, based on a compromise between the victim and the accused.
Constitutional Lacuna
The Supreme Court’s ruling to reinstate the three-year practice requirement is a blatant violation of constitutional principles. First, the rule breaches Article 14’s guarantee of equality before the law and its prohibition on arbitrariness. The rule treats identical candidates differently without a rational justification by changing the eligibility criteria for thousands of prospective judges while exempting only pre-notified recruitments. Second, the requirement imperils the freedom to practice any profession under Article 19(1)(g). A uniform three-year practice requirement fails both criteria, creating superficial barriers to judicial services.
Third, by prescribing eligibility criteria, the Supreme Court contravenes the separation of powers and federal structure. Article 234 vests authority to determine Civil Judge (Junior Division) qualifications with state governments in consultation with Public Service Commissions and High Courts, not with the Supreme Court. This action of the Supreme Court raises nothing but a question of constitutional impropriety. The Supreme Court established itself as a policymaker by restoring the three-year practice requirement without providing a constitutional basis. This action raises concerns as it contradicts the basic notion that courts should interpret the law as it is, not as they would like it to be.
Fourth, by mandating the State to separate the judiciary from the executive in public services, Article 50 reinforces the judiciary’s independence as a cornerstone of the constitutional framework. However, this rule discriminates in favour of the privileged candidates, who are better able to bear the cost of unpaid litigation, thereby undermining the socioeconomic diversity that is necessary for an independent judiciary. Conclusively, invoking salus populi est suprema lex i.e. the welfare of the people is the supreme law, the Constitution demands access and representativeness in judicial institutions. This ruling, thus, entrenches inequality and undermines meritocracy.
Gender Impact: Reversing Progress in Judiciary
The restored eligibility criterion has posed a major constraint, particularly for women. Women are frequently restricted from continuing in unpaid or low-paying litigation job for a longer time due to social restrictions like early marriage and family responsibilities. Since the three-year practice requirement demands a sustained litigation practice, often without guaranteed pay or job security, many qualified female graduates may be forced to drop out of the pipeline. This makes the entry restricted at the fundamental level due to this structural disadvantage, which hinders future representation in higher judicial posts.
Recent data shows a remarkable success of women in the judiciary. In the recent Rajasthan Judicial Services Examination, 8 out of the top 10 candidates were women. Women continue to be significantly underrepresented in the judiciary, making up only 6% of the Supreme Court quorum, 14% of High Court judges, and 38. 3% of district judges. Though underrepresented, women judges in India have played a pivotal role in shaping landmark rulings including Vishaka guidelines, Shayara Bano on triple talaq, and judgements on inheritance, property and gender justice by Justices Leila Seth and R. Banumathi. This trend reflects broader patterns of academic excellence among female law students. The current decision threatens to impede this progress, undermining decades of efforts to create a more representative judicial system.
Learning from Global Best Practices
Countries like the United States of America (USA), United Kingdom (UK), and Canada mandate prior legal practice before judicial appointments, these countries offer significantly better support systems for early-career lawyers. These countries offer financial aid, fellowships, and paid public interest work to young law graduates. For example, Law Foundation of Ontario in Canada offers Public Interest Articling Fellowships (PIAF) via non-profit organisations, while the Young Lawyer Division of American Bar Association provides assistance to young lawyers. The legal infrastructure in India, in contrast, does not offer comparable protections, particularly for first-generation lawyers.
The Way Forward
In India, judicial recruitment suffers more from flawed examinations than from lack of practice. Most state exams encourage rote memorisation instead of testing reasoning or practical skills. Judicial recruitment should be guided by the “catch them young” principle. Rather than imposing artificial barriers of practice requirements, the emphasis should be on changing the recruitment process itself.
A unified All India Judicial Services (AIJS) system, as enumerated under Article 312 of the Constitution, should be implemented to replace non-uniform state-level examinations. This would reduce discrepancies in judicial service examinations across states by ensuring a uniform curriculum, transparency and merit-based selection. Moreover, entrance examinations for the selection of High Court judges can be conducted to address nepotism and guarantee merit-based selection throughout the judicial system, which would increase transparency and accountability in higher judicial appointments. Such reform advances both competence and inclusion without compromising constitutional guarantees and access to public service.
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